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 DIRECT REFERENCE AND SINGULAR
 PROPOSITIONS
 Matthew Davidson
 I
 .lVAost direct reference theorists about
 indexicals and proper names have adopted
 the thesis that singular propositions are
 composed of physical objects and proper?
 ties.1 There have been a number of recent
 proponents of such a view, including Scott
 Soames, Nathan Salmon, John Perry,
 Howard Wettstein, and David Kaplan.2
 Since Kaplan is the individual who (at least
 recently) is best known for holding such a
 view, let's call a proposition that is com?
 posed of objects and properties a
 K-proposition. In this paper, I will attempt
 to show that (given some fairly plausible
 assumptions) a direct reference view about
 the content of proper names and indexicals
 leads very naturally to the position that all
 singular propositions are K-propositions.3
 Then, I will attempt to show that this view
 of propositions is false. I will spend the
 bulk of the paper on this latter task. My
 goal in the paper, then, is to show that adopt?
 ing the direct reference thesis comes at a cost
 (or for those who thought it already came at
 a cost because of [alleged] problems the view
 has with problems such as opacity and the
 significance of some identity statements; it
 comes at even more of a cost).
 Let's begin by examining the link between
 a direct reference view of singular terms and
 K-propositions. For many "New Theorists,"
 the connection seems so obvious that they
 don't even pause to highlight how one might
 get from a direct reference view to the exist?
 ence of K-propositions. For instance, in the
 preface to "Demonstratives" David Kaplan
 says, "If there are such terms [directly refer?
 ring terms], then the proposition expressed
 by a sentence containing such a term would
 involve individuals directly rather than by
 way of the "individual concepts" or "man?
 ners of presentation" I had been taught to
 expect."4 In "Naming Without Necessity,"
 Joseph Almog takes the existence of K
 propositions to be part of the Millian thesis.5
 However, the link between direct refer?
 ence and K-propositions can be spelled out
 fairly clearly. A direct reference view of
 the content of proper names and indexicals
 claims that the entire semantic content of
 one of these singular terms is its referent.
 So, the content of the term "Locke" in the
 following sentence
 (1) Locke is a philosopher.
 simply is the man Locke himself. So, un?
 like the traditional Fregean view, there is
 no entity (a sense or property) that "in?
 tervenes" between the term "Locke" and
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 the man Locke that plays any role in con?
 stituting the content of the term "Locke."
 The content of "Locke" is the referent
 of the term.6,7
 Typically, philosophers distinguish be?
 tween a particular sentence token and the
 content the sentence expresses. The latter
 often is taken to be a proposition, whereas
 the former is some sort of physical entity?
 e.g. a verbal utterance or marks on a page.
 There are, of course, many good reasons
 (which I won't go into here) for distin?
 guishing between a sentence qua marks on
 a page and what a sentence means or says.
 Furthermore, often it is thought that the
 proposition a sentence expresses is a func?
 tion of the contents of the sentence's
 component parts.8 Call this claim
 "compositionality." For example, in (1),
 "Locke" has a certain content, and "is a
 philosopher" has a certain content; and the
 proposition expressed by (1) is determined
 by the contents of these two component
 parts plus relations that hold between the
 contents.9 One way of accounting for this,
 many think, is that there is some sort of
 structural isomorphism between sentences
 and the propositions they express. Just as
 sentences are built up out of more primi?
 tive parts (e.g., a subject and a predicate),
 propositions are "built up" out of more
 primitive entities: the semantic contents of
 the individual parts of the sentences that
 express them. These assumptions are quite
 widely held, at least by those who take propo?
 sitions to be structured entities, rather than
 simple abstract objects or sets of worlds.
 Now we can see the relationship between
 a direct reference theory of proper names
 and indexicals and K-propositions. The
 direct reference theorist holds that the
 content of one of these singular terms is
 the term's referent. So, if the proposition ex?
 pressed by a sentence is built up from the
 contents of the sentence's component parts,
 the proposition expressed by a sentence
 with a proper name or indexical for a sub?
 ject term (as in [1]) will have the referent
 of the subject term as a component part.
 Typically, it is thought that the content of
 the predicate of a sentence is a property.10
 In (1), it would be the property being a
 philosopher. Given this fact, our previous
 assumptions, and a direct reference theory
 about the content of the term "Locke," the
 proposition expressed by (1) will be com?
 posed of the man Locke and the property
 being a philosopher. The sentences that
 express singular propositions all have di?
 rectly referring subject terms according
 to the direct reference theorist, so each
 of these sentences, like (1) (call them
 "singular sentences"), will express a K
 proposition.
 Note that it doesn't follow from this that
 all singular propositions are K-proposi?
 tions. Perhaps there are some singular
 propositions not expressible in English that
 aren't. However, many direct reference
 theorists do move from the claim that all
 singular propositions expressible in En?
 glish are K-propositions to the claim that
 all singular propositions are K-proposi?
 tions. This inference is quite natural, and
 also quite reasonable: What is it about En?
 glish that would keep us from expressing
 these other types of singular propositions?
 Let's call the view that all singular propo?
 sitions are K-propositions the K-thesis.n
 Now that we've seen why it's no acci?
 dent that many New Theorists claim that
 singular propositions are K-propositions,
 let's examine the plausibility of the notion
 of K-propositions. Are there reasons to re?
 ject these sorts of entities? Arguably there
 are. One puzzle that immediately comes to
 mind has to do with the nature of a K
 proposition. How can a proposition, which
 is supposed to be an abstract entity, have a
 physical object as a constituent? Indeed,
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 what exactly is it to say that Locke him?
 self is a constituent of the proposition
 expressed by (l)?12 It's not that the rela?
 tionship of constituenthood per se is
 unclear. We can see how the proposition
 expressed by (1) would have being a phi?
 losopher as a constituent, rather than, say,
 being a grape. But, it's really difficult to
 see what this constituent relationship
 amounts to when we're talking about
 Locke himself and the proposition ex?
 pressed by (1). Propositions are the objects
 of our propositional attitudes. But, how can
 I believe in Locke and a property? How
 can I entertain (in a non-festive sense)
 Locke and a property? The notion hardly
 seems to make sense.
 However, perhaps we can make some sense
 of what it is for Locke to be a constituent of
 the proposition expressed by (1). We can note
 that it entails the counterfactual, If Locke
 didn 't exist, the proposition expressed by (I)
 wouldn 't exist. Furthermore, there are other
 relationships between abstracta and concreta
 that might help us understand the relation?
 ship between Locke and singular
 propositions about him.13 Consider the rela?
 tionship between a set and its members. A
 set is an abstract object.14 Yet, a set is able
 to have members that are concrete. We
 seem to understand what it is for a set to
 have concrete members. Furthermore,
 (many think) there is a counterfactual claim
 that holds between a set and its mem?
 bers akin to the counterfactual claim that
 holds between a proposition and its con?
 stituents; namely, // any of a set's
 members didn't exist, the set wouldn't
 exist. So, can't sethood and memberhood
 help us to understand the relationship
 between Locke and singular propositions
 about him?
 I would answer this question negatively,
 although it's tough to know what to say at
 this point. I have a clear idea of what it is
 for a physical object to be a member of a
 set; however, I find the notion of an
 object's being a constituent of a proposi?
 tion downright mysterious. But, clearly
 there are many who disagree with me on
 this (and who seem to have no problem
 with the notion of physical object being a
 constituent of a proposition).
 However, even if one doesn't find the
 notion of a proposition having a physical
 object as a constituent problematic, K
 propositions face other serious difficulties.
 These objections center on the fact that a
 K-proposition about a contingently exist?
 ing object itself exists contingently. It
 seems plausible to say that a proposition
 has its constituents essentially. For ex?
 ample, the proposition expressed by (1)
 essentially has Locke as a constituent.
 However, this seems to entail (as we noted
 earlier), that if Locke hadn't existed, nei?
 ther would the singular proposition
 expressed by (1). Clearly, Locke exists
 contingently. Therefore, since the singular
 proposition expressed by (1) essentially
 has Locke as a constituent, it too exists
 contingently. We can see that K-proposi?
 tions are object-dependent', they are
 dependent for their existence on the objects
 they are about.
 The fact that K-propositions about con?
 tingent objects themselves exist
 contingently can be used to construct pow?
 erful arguments against the notion of
 K-propositions. We will consider two such
 at arguments, at length, in the remainder
 of the paper.
 II
 Let's turn to an argument against the K
 thesis.15 This argument has been given by
 at least Alvin Plantinga and Kit Fine, but
 so far as I know it hasn't been used the
 way I use it?as an argument against di?
 rect reference.
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 (2) It's possible that Locke not exist.
 (3) Therefore, the proposition Locke does
 not exist is possibly true.
 (4) Necessarily, if Locke does not exist is
 true, then Locke does not exist exists.
 (5) Necessarily, if Locke does not exist is
 true, then Locke does not exist.
 (6) Therefore, necessarily, if Locke does
 not exist is true, then Locke does not
 exist and Locke does not exist does ex?
 ist.
 (7) Therefore, it is possible that Locke does
 not exist exist and Locke not exist.
 (8) Propositions have their constituents es?
 sentially.
 (9) Therefore, it's false that Locke does not
 exist has Locke as a constituent.
 (10) Therefore, it's false that all singular
 propositions are K-propositions.
 What should one think of this argument?
 Clearly it's valid; so if there is to be fault
 found with it, it must be with the truth of
 the premises.
 (2) looks impeccable. Though he was a
 great philosopher (and perhaps deserves
 more credit than he gets), Locke clearly
 exists contingently. Prima facie, (3) might
 also look clearly to be true. One might
 think that to say that it is possible for Locke
 not to exist just is to say that the proposi?
 tion Locke does not exist is possibly true.
 What else could one mean by asserting (2)?
 However, the move from a proposition like
 (2) to a proposition like (3) has been con?
 tested by many friends of K-propositions.16
 It is noted by these philosophers that a
 claim like
 (11) It is necessary that p
 can be understood in different ways. One
 interpretation of ( 11) is that it means some?
 thing like
 (12) p is true in all worlds.
 Another rendering of (11), which usually
 is taken to be equivalent to (12), is
 (13) It's not possible that ~p.
 Similarly, a proposition like
 (14) It is possible that p
 can be understood in different ways. On
 one reading, it is equivalent to
 (15) p is true in some possible world.
 Another rendering of (14), which usually
 is taken to be equivalent to (15), is
 (16) It's not necessary that ~p.
 Now, some who object to the move from
 (2) to (3) will argue as follows. It doesn't
 follow from the fact that it is possible that
 Locke not exist that the proposition Locke
 does not exist is possibly true. It does fol?
 low that the proposition Locke does not
 exist is possible. But, this proposition can
 be possible without being possibly true; we
 can come up with a weaker sense of possi?
 bility that doesn't allow us to move from
 (2) to (3). We can see this by comparing
 two different readings of (14). It is not nec?
 essary for (14) to be true that (15) be true,
 they will say. All that is necessary for the
 truth of (14) is the truth of (16). It suffices
 for the possibility of Locke does not exist
 that it be false that necessarily, it's false
 that Locke does not exist. Does Locke does
 not exist meet this condition? That is, is it
 false that its complement is necessarily
 true? It does meet this condition. For, in a
 world W where Locke does not exist, nei?
 ther will the proposition it is false that
 Locke does not exist (given that it is a K
 proposition). Then, the proposition it's
 false that Locke does not exist will have
 no truth value in W; it does not exist in W.
 Therefore, the proposition it's false that
 Locke does not exist will not be necessar?
 ily true, since what it is for a proposition
 to be necessarily true is for it to be true in
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 all worlds. Since it's false that the comple?
 ment of Locke does not exist (that is, it's
 false that Locke does not exist) is neces?
 sary, Locke does not exist is possible.
 There is a problem with such a response
 to the move from (2) to (3). Consider the
 following proposition (here I mirror one
 of Plantinga's arguments):
 (17) Locke is an empiricist and is not an
 empiricist.
 Could (17) be true? Clearly it couldn't; it
 is a contradiction and necessarily false.
 However, it looks like the same reasons for
 thinking the proposition within the scope
 of the possibility operator (i.e., Locke does
 not exist) in (2) is possible can be given
 for thinking (17) is possible. It was claimed
 that this proposition in (2) is possible be?
 cause its complement isn't necessarily true.
 Its complement isn't necessarily true be?
 cause there are worlds in which it doesn't
 exist and hence has no truth value, and
 there are worlds in which it doesn't exist
 because it depends for its existence on a
 contingent object. (17) meets all of these
 conditions.17 In other words, it suffices for
 (17) to be possible that it be false that
 (18) It's false that Locke is and is not an
 empiricist
 is necessary. For (18) to be necessary,
 though, it has to exist in all possible worlds.
 But we can see it doesn't, for (18) is a sin?
 gular proposition, and it exists only if
 Locke does. So, (18) isn't necessary, and
 therefore (17) is possible.
 Clearly this is absurd. Any understand?
 ing of possibility on which an explicit
 contradiction like (17) can be possible has
 to be mistaken. Therefore, I conclude that
 this objection to the move from (2) to (3)
 is flawed. Apart from this sort of objection,
 there seems to be no reason not to think that
 (3) it true. It's therefore reasonable to think
 that if there is a problem in this argument, it
 must be in one of the other premises.
 What should we say about (4)? One rea?
 son for accepting it is that it might seem to
 follow from a more general proposition
 that one might think is true; namely, if an
 object has a property in some world, then
 it exists in that world. In other words, one
 may think that the following proposition
 is true (and that it entails [4]):
 (19) Necessarily, for any object o, any prop?
 erty p, and any world W, if o has p in
 then o exists in W.
 (19) is a statement of what has been
 called property actualism by Kit Fine,
 and serious actualism by Alvin
 Plantinga.18 Although (19) may look
 clearly correct prima facie, many people
 have rejected it (for instance, doesn't an
 object have the property nonexistence in
 worlds in which it doesn't exist?). One
 reason to accept (19) is that it might
 seem to follow from actualism.19 Con?
 sider the following argument:
 (20) Necessarily, for any property p and
 world W, if p is exemplified in W, then
 there is (where the existential quanti?
 fier here is unrestricted to range over
 Meinongian/Lewisian possibilia) some?
 thing in W that exemplifies p.
 (21) Necessarily, whatever there is (unre?
 stricted) in W, exists in W.
 (22) Therefore, necessarily, whatever there
 is that exemplifies p in W, exists in W.
 It seems to me that this short argument is
 sound. The argument is valid. Furthermore,
 (20) also seems to be true; if p is exempli?
 fied in a world, then there has to be (in as
 broad a sense as one likes) something in that
 world that exemplifies it. Since the only can?
 didates there are for the things in that world
 that exemplify p are objects that exist in that
 world as (21), which follows from actualism,
 we arrive at the truth of serious actualism.
 So, if we accept (19), can we conclude
 that (4) is true? Many direct reference
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 theorists claim that to move from (19) to
 (4) is to misunderstand how we should
 evaulate the truth of propositions with re?
 spect to various worlds. Even if a
 proposition p doesn't exist in a particular
 world W, from our perspective in the ac?
 tual world, we may be able to evaluate the
 truth of p with respect to W. For instance,
 David Kaplan notes as being important
 the distinction between what exists at a given
 point and what can be "carried in" to be
 evaluated at that point, though it may exist
 only elsewhere. My "Circumstances of
 Evaluation" [similar to possible worlds]
 evaluate contents that may have no native
 existence at the circumstance but can be ex?
 pressed elsewhere and carried in for
 evaluation.20
 Joseph Almog makes a similar point in
 "Naming Without Necessity."21 For Almog,
 what we do is "generate" the propositions
 at our world, and evaluate them with re?
 spect to all other worlds, whether these
 propositions exist there or not.
 Perhaps the clearest statement of this sort
 of position is by Robert Adams.22 Adams
 contends that there is an ambiguity in our
 statement of (4). To show this, Adams
 draws a distinction between a proposition
 being true in a world and a proposition
 being true at a world. Adams contends that
 if a proposition is true in a world, then it
 must exist in that world. That is to say, if a
 proposition p is true in a world W, then,
 necessarily, if W were actual, then p would
 exist. However, a proposition can be true
 at a world without existing in a world; it
 doesn't follow from the fact that a propo?
 sition p is true at a world W that,
 necessarily, if W were actual, then p would
 exist. Here is one of Adams's clearer state?
 ments of the notion.23
 A world-story [possible world] that includes
 no singular proposition about me constitutes
 and describes a possible world in which I
 would not exist. It represents my possible
 non-existence, not by including the proposi?
 tion that I do not exist but simply by omitting
 me. That I would not exist if all the proposi?
 tions it includes, and no other actual
 propositions, were true is not a fact internal
 to the world that it describes, but an observa?
 tion that we make from our vantage point in
 the actual world, about the relation of that
 world-story to an individual of the actual world.
 Let me mark this difference in point of view
 by saying that the proposition that I never
 exist is (in the actual world) true at many
 possible worlds, but in none.
 I take Adams to be making the same sort
 of point that Kaplan and Almog are mak?
 ing. We can (in Kaplan's terminology)
 "carry in" propositions that exist actually,
 and evaulate their truth with respect to
 other worlds "from our vantage point in the
 actual world." My main problem with this
 sort of response to the move from (19) to
 (4) is that, try as I might, I can't make sense
 of it. Nowhere in the literature is it clearly
 explained so far as I can tell. I can (some?
 what) visualize the picture these people are
 working with, but frankly I can't see how
 it's anything more than that, a picture. I
 certainly understand why with regard to a
 world W where Locke does not exist it
 seems that the proposition Locke does not
 exist correctly describes the situation with
 regard to W better than, say, Locke is a
 lion-tamer does. However, if neither sin?
 gular proposition exists in W, then why is
 this the case? To put the point a different
 way, it seems that there has to be some fact
 about W (possible worlds are maximal) that
 makes it the case that the former proposi?
 tion does accurately describe the situation
 with regard to W better than the latter
 proposition does. What makes it the case
 that Locke does not exist is true at W, and
 Locke is a lion-tamer isn't? It would seem
 that there would have to be something
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 internal to the world in question that would
 explain this. It certainly is the case that
 "from our perspective," the former accu?
 rately describes the way W is; whereas, the
 latter does not. But isn't this because it is
 a fact about W that if W were actual the
 former would be true, and the latter false?
 Quite frankly, it is difficult to say much
 about this distinction because of the degree
 of obscurity involved. However, it cer?
 tainly isn't the responsibility of the foe of
 K-propositions to render the concept more
 lucid. Until someone does produce a
 clearer rendering of the truth-at/truth-in
 distinction (or variations thereof), I con?
 tend that it appears that claiming that (4)
 is false because of a failure to distinguish
 between these two concepts fails. Based on
 the explication of the distinction we have
 from proponents like Adams, Kaplan, and
 Almog, I contend that the fact that a propo?
 sition correctly describes a possible world
 "from our perspective" needs to be analyzed
 in terms of there being a proposition in the
 world (internal to the world) in question.
 Apart from these two objections, (4)
 seems to be correct. The premises after (4)
 appear unobjectionable. (5) is clearly right.
 (6) follows from (4) and (5). (7) follows
 from (3) and (6), and (8) is a very plausible
 claim about the nature of propositions. (9)
 follows from (7) and (8), and (10) follows
 from (9), the concept of a K-proposition,
 and the fact that Locke does not exist is a
 singular proposition.
 One response a direct reference theorist
 might be tempted to make when faced with
 this sort of argument is to claim that exist?
 ence is a second-order predicate. The
 objection to this response that immediately
 springs to mind is that, for the direct refer?
 ence theorist, singular terms (indexicals and
 proper names, at least) don't express proper?
 ties or individual concepts. Hence, existence
 (in the context of singular sentences) can't
 be a second-order predicate because there
 is nothing for it to be a predicate or prop?
 erty of. Therefore, if the direct reference
 theorist wants to claim that existence is a
 second-order predicate to circumvent the
 argument in section II, she will have to
 claim that singular terms express proper?
 ties in sentences where existence is
 predicated of a subject. On the face of it,
 this maneuver might seem ad hoc. Why
 shouldn't singular terms in existential sen?
 tences function the same way they do in
 other types of sentences? However, the di?
 rect reference theorist might point out that
 existence is itself a peculiar sort of predi?
 cate, and one shouldn't be surprised if it
 affects the sentences in which it appears.
 It should be noted that if the friend of K
 propositions accepts this response to the
 argument in section II, the property or in?
 dividual concept expressed by these
 singular terms must be such that they al?
 low for rigid designation (they will have
 to be essences). Otherwise, one encounters
 serious problems.241 have yet to encoun?
 ter anyone who accepts this sort of view
 of singular terms. However, for anyone
 who would be tempted by such a view, they
 should justify this bifurcation in the ways
 that singular terms refer: Why not allow
 that all indexicals and proper names refer
 by way of some sort of essence?25
 There is another potential objection to
 this argument. It seems that I am assum?
 ing that we can't actually have propositions
 that contain Locke as a constituent if Locke
 doesn't actually exist. But perhaps we can.
 How is this? Locke exists in other worlds,
 so why can't Locke in another world serve
 as a physical constituent of a proposition
 about Locke in this world?
 The objector here has misunderstood
 what it is for objects to exist in worlds (for
 an actualist?we'll consider actualism
 momentarily). Locke exists in some
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 nonactual world W iff were W actual,
 Locke would exist. This is a standard
 actualist rendering of what it is for an ob?
 ject to exist in a world (it comes from
 Plantinga). Though propositions are ab?
 stract objects, the same sort of analysis of
 existing in a world should apply to them.
 Consider a world W' where Locke does not
 exist. Suppose that W' is actual. The propo?
 sition Locke does not exist is true in W'.
 But we've no Locke to be a constituent of
 this proposition. Why not "borrow" physi?
 cal Locke from W? The answer is that
 though W exists in W' (it exists necessar?
 ily), W is an abstract entity, a maximal state
 of affairs or a maximal proposition of some
 sort. It doesn't "contain" physical objects
 except in the sense that were it actual, cer?
 tain physical objects (e.g., Locke) would
 exist. There is no physical man Locke that
 exists when W' is actual to be a constitu?
 ent of K-propositions about Locke, even
 though there are abstract objects (possible
 worlds) that exist when W' is actual that
 portray or represent Locke as existing. But
 these are nonactual (they don't obtain) and
 wholly abstract.
 Consider the analogy with sets. In a
 world W where Locke does not exist,
 Locke can't be a member of a set (in W).
 There are other worlds that represent Locke
 as existing that exist in W (and no doubt
 Locke is a member of innumerable sets in
 these worlds). But these other worlds are
 abstract and we can't "borrow" a physical
 object from them so we can have sets with
 Locke as a member in W. In the actual
 world a there are sets only about objects
 that exist in a. No doubt many of the ob?
 jects that are members of sets in the actual
 world are members of sets in other worlds.
 But this is just to say were any of these
 other worlds actual, these objects would be
 members of sets. In worlds where he doesn't
 exist, Locke isn't around to be a member of
 a set or a constituent of a proposition.
 Here is another potential parallel
 counterargument to the main argument I've
 given above. Consider first Locke's single?
 ton, a set that exists in a. Consider a world
 in which Locke doesn't exist. In such a
 world Locke is not a member of his single?
 ton, for he doesn't exist. This means it is
 contingent whether Locke is a member of
 his singleton. But sets have their members
 essentially. Hence sets do not exist. If the
 main argument of this section is a good one,
 this argument also should be a good one. But
 its conclusion is absurd. Hence there is a flaw
 somewhere in the main argument.
 This argument is flawed. In a world
 where Locke doesn't exist, neither does his
 singleton. So we can't deduce that Locke
 is contingently (not essentially) a member
 of his singleton simply by considering a
 world in which Locke does not exist. Note
 also that we have no reason for thinking
 that Locke's singleton exists in worlds
 where Locke does not exist. On the other
 hand, in worlds where Locke does not ex?
 ist, we have (obviously) prima facie a
 strong reason to think that Locke does not
 exist exists and is true. As we've seen, this
 claim is controversial, but I suspect that all
 would concede that prima facie there cer?
 tainly is reason to think that this proposition
 exists in worlds where Locke doesn't.
 Ill
 Most philosophers are actualists. That is,
 they accept something very close to the
 following claim
 (23) Necessarily, whatever there is (where
 the existential quantifier is "unre?
 stricted" to include Lewisian-type
 possible worlds, or Meinongian-type
 nonactual objects), exists.26
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 To assert (23) is not to follow Spinoza in
 claiming that the only possible world is the
 actual world. Rather, to assert (23) is to say
 that there aren't, nor could there have been,
 any objects that don't exist. Actualism is
 an extremely attractive position.27 How?
 ever, I won't argue for it here. Rather, I
 will argue in this section of the paper that
 if actualism is true (as well as certain plau?
 sible assumptions about the nature of
 possible worlds), then the K-thesis is false.
 For the actualist, possible worlds (if she
 thinks there are such things) will be con?
 structed of entities that exist actually.
 Typically, actualists think of possible
 worlds as maximal (sets of) intensional
 entities.28 Consider Robert Adams's under?
 standing of possible worlds, or
 "world-stories" as he calls them. He says,
 Let us say that a world-story is a maximal
 consistent set of propositions. That is, it is a
 set which has as its members one member of
 every pair of mutually contradictory propo?
 sitions, and which is such that it is possible
 that all of its members be true together.29
 Alvin Plantinga thinks of possible worlds
 in terms of maximal states of affairs. He
 says,
 a pair of states of affairs S and S' may be so
 related that it is not possible that both ob?
 tain, in which case S precludes S'; and if it
 is impossible that S obtain and S' not ob?
 tain, then S includes S'. . . . Still further, a
 state of affairs S may be such that for any
 state of affairs, S', S either includes or pre?
 cludes S\ in which case S is maximal. Now
 we may say that a possible world is just a
 maximal possible state of affairs.30
 Adams's and Plantinga's views about the
 nature of possible worlds represent two of
 the most common views of the nature of
 possible worlds among actualists. For
 clarity's sake, let's adopt Adams's concep?
 tion of possible worlds for use in the rest
 of this argument.3132
 We are now in a position to see an un?
 welcome consequence of the notion of
 K-propositions; it entails that it's impos?
 sible that there exist individuals who don't
 exist in the actual world. In other words,
 there is nothing that doesn't exist in a, the
 actual world, that could have existed. Con?
 sider some world W, which contains some
 individual I who doesn't exist in a.33 In the
 maximal set of propositions that is W, there
 is at least one singular proposition about I.
 Call this proposition "p." It is clear p is
 essential to W. W is a set, and a set has all
 its members essentially.34 So, if p didn't
 exist, neither would W. It also is clear that
 p doesn't exist in a since I doesn't exist in
 a, and I's existence (since I is a constitu?
 ent of p) is essential to p. Therefore, we
 can see that W doesn't exist in a. It fol?
 lows from this that it's not possible that
 there exist any individuals who don't exist
 in a. For, what is it to be possible that there
 exist individuals that don't exist in a? It is
 for there to be a possible world in which
 there exists an individual who doesn't ex?
 ist in a. But there are no such worlds. Such
 worlds essentially include singular propo?
 sitions that don't exist.35
 One response that an actualist proponent
 of the K-thesis might be tempted to make
 goes as follows. The above sorts of con?
 siderations show that we need to be careful
 about the sorts of propositions we allow to
 function as constituents of our possible
 worlds. Otherwise, it does look like we
 wind up with unwelcome consequences.
 However, there is an easy way to fix this
 problem: Leave singular propositions like
 the proposition expressed by (1) out of our
 possible worlds. This way, we can main?
 tain that our possible worlds exist
 necessarily.
 This will not work. Consider a world W
 where Locke doesn't exist. In W, the propo?
 sition expressed by (1) won't exist. But
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 clearly, relative to W the proposition ex?
 pressed by (1) could have existed. So, we
 will want to represent his fact in W. In other
 words, we will want the proposition that it
 is possible that Locke is a philosopher ex?
 ist to be true in W. But, this is a singular
 proposition about a singular proposition,
 and for the direct reference theorist (who
 already was committed to K-propositions),
 it looks like the existence of this proposi?
 tion will entail that the singular proposition
 that it is about exists. One way to avoid
 this is to jettison the direct reference the?
 sis in this case, and claim that instead of
 having the meaning of "that Locke is a phi?
 losopher" in the second-order singular
 proposition be the proposition it refers to,
 claim the meaning of this sentence is an
 individual essence of the proposition Locke
 is a philosopher. This would seem to cir?
 cumvent the problem, but at the cost of
 giving up the direct reference thesis. If one
 is willing to give up the direct reference
 thesis about singular terms in this case,
 why not in all cases?36
 There is an even more direct way to show
 that the K-thesis entails that there could not
 be any individuals that don't exist in a.
 Suppose that there could be an individual
 I who doesn't exist in a, and the K-thesis
 is true. Then the proposition
 (24) It is possible that I exist.
 is true in a.37 Given the truth of serious
 actualism (19), the truth of (24) in a en?
 tails that (24) exists in a. However, we
 know that (24) doesn't exist in cc, since I
 doesn't exist in a, and (24) is a K-proposi
 tion. Therefore, if the K-thesis is true, there
 couldn't exist any individuals who don't
 exist in a.38
 A response that the K-theorist might be
 tempted to give goes as follows. It's true
 that there are no singular propositions
 about I. But, there are propositions that
 "say" that it's possible that there be an in
 dividual distinct from those individuals
 that exist in a. These propositions won't
 be expressed with singular sentences,
 though. Rather, they will be expressed with
 sentences using an existential quantifier
 (e.g., it's possible that there be some indi?
 vidual x such that for any y that exists in
 a, x is distinct from y). The fact that we
 have these more general existential claims
 allows us to account for our intuitions that
 it's true that there could be an individual
 distinct from all actual individuals.
 The first thing to note about this response
 is that if it works, it is a response only to
 the second argument to the conclusion that
 the K-thesis entails that it's not possible
 that there be any individuals distinct from
 those that actually exist. The question to
 ask, then, is whether this response neutral?
 izes the force of the second argument. It
 does go some way in accounting for our
 intuitions that it is true (i.e., there is a true
 proposition) that there could have been an
 individual distinct from all actual individu?
 als. However, the argument does not go far
 enough. There certainly are true "general
 existential" propositions of the sort ex?
 pressed by the example sentence in the last
 paragraph with the existential quantifiers.
 But, it seems as though there also are true
 singular propositions about individuals
 that don't exist. No doubt that we may not
 be in a position to entertain many of these.
 But we certainly can entertain some of
 them. For example, suppose I fashion sepa?
 rately two halves of a table such that, if I
 were to stick the two halves together, a
 table would come into existence.39 Suppose
 the two halves are sitting in front of me in
 my workshop. Now, it seems as though I
 can entertain singular propositions about
 the table that would exist, were I to put the
 two halves of the table together. The fact
 that I can entertain these propositions en?
 tails (trivially) that these propositions exist.
 No doubt I also can entertain general
This content downloaded from 139.182.75.138 on Fri, 13 Jul 2018 18:20:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIRECT REFRENCE AND SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS / 295
 propositions that would be expressed with
 sentences with existential quantifiers in
 them. But, it also seems that I can enter?
 tain singular propositions about the
 (nonexistent) table. Hence, I conclude that
 trying to account for intuitions that there
 are true propositions that "claim" that there
 could be an individual distinct from any
 individual that exists in a by claiming that
 these propositions are general existential
 propositions fails. It seems as though there
 also are singular propositions about (some,
 at least) such nonexistent individuals.
 Clearly, the conclusion that it is not pos?
 sible for there to be individuals who don't
 exist in a is a problem for the K-thesis.
 Since a direct reference theory of singular
 terms, together with some very plausible
 metaphysical assumptions, leads quite
 naturally to the K-thesis, I take the con?
 clusion of the argument we've just seen to
 count against the direct reference theory.
 I have attempted to show that there are
 difficulties with the notion of K-proposi?
 tions. In particular, there are two strong
 arguments that can be raised against the K
 thesis that start from the fact that
 K-propositions about contingent objects
 themselves exist contingently. First, some
 propositions cannot depend for their exist?
 ence on the objects they are about, since
 these propositions would be true (and ipso
 facto exist) if the objects they were about
 didn't exist. Second, the K-thesis entails
 that it is impossible that there exist any
 individuals that don't exist in a. These argu?
 ments count strongly against the K-thesis.
 Since the direct reference theory, together
 with some very plausible views about the
 nature of propositions, leads very naturally
 to K-thesis, there is a cost, and perhaps more
 of a cost than others have noted, to accept?
 ing the direct reference thesis.40
 University of Wisconsin
 NOTES
 1. By "singular proposition," I mean a proposition that is, in a significant sense, "directly about" a
 particular individual. Some have taken "singular proposition" to mean "a proposition with an indi?
 vidual as a constituent." But, it seems to me (and many others) that a proposition with a haecceity as
 a constituent also would count as a singular proposition. One might even be willing to claim that a
 proposition with any sort of individual essence as a constituent would count as a singular proposition.
 Then, it seems a minimum necessary condition for a proposition to be a singular proposition is that the
 subject constituent allow for rigid designation. In arguing against K-propositions, then, I don't mean
 to be arguing against singular propositions per se. Rather, my arguments are directed at a particular
 type of singular proposition. Of course, I'm perfectly willing to grant the proponent of K-propositions
 the term "singular proposition," but then we will want to coin a term that will cover all types of
 propositions that are "directly about" particular individuals.
 2. See Scott Soames, "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content," in Propo?
 sitions and Attitudes, ed. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
 1988); Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991); John Perry, The Problem
 of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays (New York: Oxford, 1993), especially "Thought
 Without Representation"; Howard Wettstein, Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? and Other
 Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) (although in one of the chronologically latter
 essays in the book he indicates a desire to dispense with propositions altogether); and (esp. early
 in the essay ) David Kaplan, "Demonstratives" in Themes From Kaplan, ed. Joseph Almog, John
 Perry, and Howard Wettstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and "Dthat" reprinted
 in Demonstratives,, ed. Palle Yourgrau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
This content downloaded from 139.182.75.138 on Fri, 13 Jul 2018 18:20:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 296 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
 3.1 should also note that some (for instance, see Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence [Princeton:
 Princeton University Press, 1981], p. 22) think of a view on which the content of a rigid term is
 the haecceity of the individual it designates as a direct reference view. The arguments in this
 paper won't apply to this sort of view about content. So, if one wants to say that this sort of view
 of reference ought to be included among direct reference views, one should regard the arguments
 of this paper as applying only to a class of direct reference views.
 4. Themes from Kaplan, p. 483.
 5. Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83, (1986), p. 228. I should note that I take the Millian thesis of
 names to be distinct from a direct reference view of names. The former is a claim about how
 reference is secured; names are just "tags" that serve to denote their referent. Reference is not
 secured via any sort of description. The latter is a claim about the content a term contributes to
 the semantic content of expressions in which the term appears; rather than contributing a qualita?
 tive sense or property, the term contributes the individual designated. However, with the direct
 reference thesis (unlike the Millian thesis) a description can factor in securing reference.
 6. This isn't to say that descriptions can't play a role in "fixing the reference" of a rigid term. Nor
 is this supposed to rule out indexical terms having a character. But, for those descriptions that do
 serve to fix the reference of a term (either in the way that a character does, as a description that is
 "constantly with" the term, or in the way that an initial reference-fixing description does), they
 aren't part of the semantic content of that term. Also, strictly speaking the direct reference doesn't
 entail the existence of propositions. One could think that the semantic contribution of, e.g., a
 name is its referent and not think that there are propositions, or in particular K-propositions.
 However, every direct reference theorist I know of thinks that K-propositions exist, and as I try
 to show above, there is ample motivation for the direct reference theorist to think that there are
 K-propositions.
 7. Some (as Dennis Stampe did) may respond that the claim in the last sentence of the above
 paragraph isn't quite right. We shouldn't say that the content of a name is its referent. Rather, we
 should say that names have no content, only referents. So, we need to be careful about how we
 express compositionality; we should say that the content of a sentence is built up out of the
 meanings of its constituent parts that have content. Names don't, so this response would block
 the move from a direct reference theory of names to K-propositions. But, it seems to me that
 there is a problem with holding compositionality together with the claim that names have no
 content, only referents. Consider the sentences, "Locke is a philosopher" and "Hume is a phi?
 losopher." Clearly, they express different propositions. But, how can this view account for this
 fact? If the contents of sentences are determined (totally) by the contents of their component
 parts that have content (plus relevant relations that hold between the contents), and names have
 no content, these two sentences should express the same proposition. Therefore, I contend that a
 direct reference theorist who accepts compositionality should claim that names do have content.
 8. There are, of course, good reasons for thinking this, the main one being the Davidsonian argu?
 ment that it explains how we are able to learn an entire language from a finite stock of predicates
 and subject terms.
 9. I should say that I'm neutral as to whether the grammatical form of (1) illustrates its true
 semantic form. For instance, one might say that though (1) is a subject-predicate sentence, there
 are more than two content-bearing entities in (1): In addition to "Locke" and "philosopher," "is"
 expresses a relational tie that holds between the contents of the former words. This relational tie
 helps to explain the "unity of the proposition" with which Russell, Strawson, Ramsey, Geach,
 and others were concerned. However one thinks of the semantic form of (1) (as long as one
 grants that compositionality holds, and "Locke" has semantic content), my claim will go through.
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 10. It may also be a relation, if the predicate is a relational predicate.
 11.1 should note that for those who don't accept the move from the claim that all singular propo?
 sitions expressible in English are K-propositions to the claim that all singular propositions are
 K-propositions, we could run substantially the same arguments against the direct reference theory
 with the weaker claim. In the argument in section II, the singular proposition in question is ex?
 pressed by an English sentence (so our conclusion would be something like, "There is at least
 one singular proposition expressible in English that is not a K-proposition."). With the argu?
 ments in III, no world exists that is such that if it were to obtain there would be singular propositions
 expressible in English about individuals who don't exist in a. So, (at best) the only individuals
 who don't exist but who could have existed are those such that they exist in worlds that have no
 singular propositions that are expressible in English about individuals who don't exist in a. How?
 ever, I find the move from the claim that all singular propositions expressible in English are
 K-propositions to the claim that all singular propositions are K-propositions plausible.
 12. This was, of course, Frege's response to Russell's acceptance of K-propositions. See "Selec?
 tion from the Frege-Russell Correspondence," in Propositions and Attitudes. Also, one might
 think that this is an example of an understanding of "proposition" on which propositions aren't
 abstract entities. One could claim this; however, most proponents of K-propositions want to claim
 that K-propositions count as abstracta.
 13. One might think that certain properties, like being taller than Bill Clinton, are other examples
 of abstracta that have physical objects as constituents. I don't believe that properties have physi?
 cal objects as constituents, if indeed properties have constituents; I take properties to be wholly
 abstract entities. But suppose Bill Clinton was part of the property being taller than Bill Clinton.
 Then consider a world where Bill Clinton doesn't exist and I do. In this paper we're thinking of
 propositions as entities built up out of constituent parts, properties, relations, and perhaps physi?
 cal objects. So it seems reasonable to say that being taller than Bill Clinton is a constituent of the
 proposition / am taller than Bill Clinton. Supposedly this is false in our imagined world, for Bill
 Clinton doesn't exist. Of course, it is also false that I am shorter than Bill Clinton. So we have a
 true proposition in this world, It is false that I am taller than Bill Clinton. But if one its constitu?
 ents has Bill Clinton as a constituent, and properties have their constituents essentially (as seems
 reasonable) this proposition won't exist in the world we're considering, for Bill Clinton doesn't
 exist there. But then it seems impossible for It is false that I am taller than Bill Clinton to be true
 in this world; it doesn't exist in this world. (Serious actualism, a position we'll examine shortly,
 entails that this proposition doesn't have the property being false.) So it looks like we have here
 an argument to the conclusion that properties don't have physical objects as constituents.
 14.1 wish to head off the response that maybe a proposition just is a set. It's awfully difficult to see
 how a set can be believed, or can be true or false. A set may model in some ways a proposition, but
 pace Stalnaker (and Lewis, depending on how one reads him), a proposition can't be a set.
 15. Versions of this argument have been described by Kit Fine, "Postscript," in Worlds, Times,
 and Selves by Arthur Prior and Kit Fine (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press: 1977), pp.
 149-150; Christopher Menzel in "Singular Propositions and Modal Logic," Philosophical Top?
 ics, vol. 21, (1993), pp. 113-148; and Alvin Plantinga, among others. Fine says in "Plantinga on
 the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse" (in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin and Peter van
 Inwagen [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985], p. 161) that his version of the argument derives from Arthur
 Prior. The most forceful statement of this sort of argument I know of is in Plantinga's "On Exis?
 tentialism," Philosophical Studies, vol. 44 (1983), pp. 1-20.1 have been significantly influenced
 by Plantinga's presentation of this argument.
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 16. For instance, see Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, vol. 49 (1981), pp. 3
 41; and Kit Fine, "Postscript," in Worlds, Times, and Selves.
 17. See "On Existentialism," pp. 18-19.
 18. See Kit Fine, "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse," p. 163; and "Replies," p.
 316 in Alvin Plantinga.
 19. This is similar to an argument given by Plantinga in "Replies," pp. 318-319. See also "Two
 Concepts of Modality," p. 197 in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. I: Metaphysics, ed. James
 Tomberlin (Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1987).
 20. "Afterthoughts," in Themes from Kaplan, p. 613.
 21. Almog, pp. 238-239.
 22. This isn't meant to imply that Adams accepts a direct reference theory. See Actualism and
 Thisness, pp. 18-32.
 23. Adams, p. 22. Christopher Menzel also defends a truth in/truth at distinction in "Singular
 Propositions and Modal Logic."
 24. As Keith Donnellan points out in "Speaking of Nothing," reprinted in Naming, Necessity, and
 Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 235.
 25.1 should note briefly that I think there is a temporal analogue to the argument in this section.
 Call the view on which there are no past or future individuals presentism. Call the position that
 objects have properties at a time only if they exist at that time serious presentism. There will be
 an argument from presentism to serious presentism analogous to the argument from actualism to
 serious actualism. Then, suppose that Locke doesn't exist right now. So the proposition Locke
 does not exist is true right now. However, if the K-thesis is true, this proposition is a K-proposi
 tion and hence doesn't exist right now. But, if this proposition is true right now, serious presentism
 says it must exist. Therefore Locke does not exist is not a K-proposition. Therefore the K-thesis is
 false. The friend of K-propositions will make moves analogous to the moves she makes in the
 argument in section II, and the responses to them will be analogous to responses made in section II.
 This argument against the K-thesis is weaker than the argument in section II due to the fact that
 presentism isn't as clearly true as actualism is (although it seems to me that presentism is true).
 26. See, for instance, Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality," and "Replies" p. 314. One
 might also formulate actualism along the lines suggested by Robert Stalnaker in "Counterparts
 and Identity" (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol XI: Studies in Essentialism, ed. Peter A. French,
 Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
 1986], p. 121). Stalnaker takes actualism to be the denial of possibilism, which according to
 Stalnaker is the thesis that things "may exist without actually existing." So, I take Stalnaker's
 formulation of actualism to be something like, "Necessarily, whatever exists, actually exists,"
 where the first "exists" is an "unrestricted" sort of quantification, and the second "exists," is
 restricted in virtue of its being modified by the nonrigid term "actually." I prefer the formulation
 of (23); it seems to more clearly capture the essence of the actualist thesis. Compare Christopher
 Menzel's formulation early on in "Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Se?
 mantics," Synthese, vol. 85 (1990), pp. 355-389.
 27. See chapters 7 and 8 of Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.
 28. That is to say, either they are maximal sets of intensional entities, or they are maximal inten
 sional entities (something like large conjunctions).
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 29. "Theories of Actuality," p. 204, reprinted in The Possible and the Actual, ed. Michael Loux
 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
 30. "Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?" reprinted in Loux, p. 147.
 31. Note that we could use Plantinga's conception, or any conception on which there are singular
 intensional entities. For, the same sorts of arguments that led the direct reference theorist about
 proper names and demonstratives to adopt K-propositions could be given to lead the direct refer?
 ence theorist to adopt a view on which physical objects are constituents of other singular intensional
 entities. For instance, consider the phrase "Locke's being a philosopher. " This phrase expresses
 the state of affairs Locke's being a philosopher. The semantic contribution of the term '"Locke"
 to the sentence "Locke is a philosopher" is, for the direct reference theorist, the man Locke. If we
 assume, as we did with propositions, that states of affairs are in some sense structurally isomor
 phic to the phrases that express them, and they are built up out of the content of the parts of the
 phrases that express them, Locke himself will be a constituent of the state of affairs Locke's
 being a philosopher. Indeed, I know of no one who adopts K-propositions who doesn't adopt
 their analogue with respect to other singular intensional entities.
 32. I think that these two actualist conceptions of possible worlds are most plausible. However,
 there are other ways for an actualist to think about possible worlds. One way would be to take
 them as primitive properties (or some sort of primitive, unstructured abstract entity), as Stalnaker
 suggests in "Possible Worlds" in Loux. Briefly, the problem I see with this is that possible worlds
 are supposed to represent what goes on in the (for lack of a better term) "concrete" world (where
 the "concrete" world includes abstracta). But, how is a primitive property going to have the
 requisite representational capacity? (Of course, Stalnaker has other reasons for taking possible
 worlds to be primitive properties: He wants to reduce propositions to sets of possible worlds.)
 Secondly, one could take a possible world to be a set of actually existing entities?"metaphysical
 atoms," as it were. For instance, these "atoms" might be occupied space-time points (as Quine
 suggests). (Very) Briefly, the problem with this proposal is that it seems hard-pressed to account
 for the intuition that there might have been more "atoms" than there are. See William Lycan,
 "The Trouble With Possible Worlds;" and M. J. Cress well, "The World is Everything That is the
 Case," both in Loux.
 33. Again: Necessarily, an individual I exists in a world W iff if W were actual, then I would exist
 (read the conditional here as strict implication).
 34. Note again that if we used a view on which possible worlds are maximal conjunctions of
 intensional objects, we could run the same argument. For, the individual conjuncts (in this case,
 at least; there may be counterexamples to this on a coarse-grained view of intensional entities) of
 the conjunction that is the possible world are each necessary for the existence of the conjunction.
 35. It might be thought that there is a quick answer to this argument; one can give up S5. S4
 would be the correct modal system for such a view; the accessibility relations clearly will be
 transitive and reflexive, but not symmetrical. However, this maneuver will not solve the prob?
 lem. Suppose we do give up S5. Then, we will say that a proposition p is possible, relative to a,
 iff there is a possible world accessible from a where p is true. However, there are no possible
 worlds accessible from a where it is true that there exists an individual who doesn't exist in a.
 It's not possible relative to this world that there exist any individuals who don't actually exist.
 36. One reason that many people hold to a direct reference theory of singular terms is that they
 believe that it is necessary for rigid designation. But this is false; one can hold that singular terms
 (names and demonstratives) express properties and that they rigidly designate, if one holds that
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 the properties that are expressed by these terms are essences. See, for instance, Alvin Plantinga
 in his "Self-Profile" in Alvin Plantinga, pp. 76-88.
 37. No doubt some will want to invoke here the (or a version of the) truth in/at distinction and say
 that (24) isn't true in a, although it is true at a. However, as we've already seen, it's not at all
 clear what someone who utters these words means by them.
 38.1 should note that the (actualist) non-direct reference theorist has a way to represent its being
 possible that some individual I who doesn't exist in the actual world exist. How so? The non
 direct reference theorist can use properties to go "proxy" for the nonexistent individual. To allow
 for rigid designation, the property expressed by the name "I" should be some sort of essence. The
 sort of essence involved will depend on one's metaphysical inclinations. If one finds the notion
 of haecceities of nonexistent individuals problematic, then one can use world-indexed properties
 as an essence. If one doesn't have any problems with haecceites of individuals who don't exist
 (as I don't; although it seems as though we might have problems grasping such a property, I
 don't see why such properties shouldn't exist), one can allow either haecceities or world-indexed
 properties to serve as the property expressed by the name "I." If one does think that haecceities
 can't exist unexemplified, then propositions incorporating haecceities shouldn't be allowed to
 help constitute possible worlds. One can allow these propositions to be represented by something
 (e.g., a proposition, state of affairs) that helps to constitute a possible world. But (as we've seen
 here), if one allows contingently existing propositions to help constitute one's possible worlds,
 these possible worlds themselves wind up existing contingently.
 39. There are deep issues in the metaphysics of material objects lurking here. For instance, maybe
 there are no tables, or maybe putting the two halves of the table together doesn't bring into
 existence a new object. I follow common-sense intuitions that we can bring an object (a table, at
 least) into existence by fashioning separately two halves of a table and sticking the two halves
 together.
 40. I would like to thank Alan Sidelle, Alvin Plantinga, Gordon Barnes, Michael Byrd, Tom
 Crisp, David Vanderlaan, Dennis Stampe, and anonymous referees from American Philosophical
 Quarterly for helpful suggestions and guidance.
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